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I. INTRODUCTION
Although public accountability has never been far removed from the
environment in which colleges and universities function, added in the 1970's
to that environment, especially by state legislatures, was the insistence that
public colleges and universities abandon the notion, encouraged by the
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expansionist mood of the 1950's and 1960's, that they were routinely entitled
to substantial increases in state appropriations. Financial considerations
were not the sole inspirations of efforts in the 1970's to subject higher
education to stricter accountability; to argue othenvise is to ignore concerns
expressed in various circles about the perceived reluctance of higher ed-
ucation to accommodate the educational needs of the high-technology and
service-based economy of post-industrial society, the apparent lack of plan-
ning among many colleges and universities for the demographic changes
either already occurring or predictably to occur over the 1980's and 1990's,
and, more pervasively, the possibility that public education at all levels in
the United States was failing to make its appropriate contribution to
enhancing both the quality of life at home and the competitiveness of the
United States abroad.
That many, if not all, colleges and universities in the United States
attempted to respond to these concerns is still only vaguely recognized
outside the academic community. Evidence of the responses, or attempted
responses, however, is readily available.' Strategic planning headed the
agenda, programmatically consequential on certain campuses and more
controversial than consequential on other campuses. A new lexicon, in-
cluding "retrenchment," "reallocation," "early retirement," "self-fund-
ing," "prioritization," and "selective improvement," developed to describe
the variety of strategies which administrators employed in response to the
separate, and not always congenial, goals of qualitative improvement and
costs reductions. State legislatures adopted a variety of approaches to
encourage, if not to compel, public colleges and universities both to change
and to economize. The use of state higher education coordinating agencies,
with regulatory as well as advisory powers, became widely accepted.2
Whatever the long-term consequences of the efforts initiated in the
1970's by state legislatures to secure economy and programmatic change
in public higher education, the intensified state regulation that accompanied
these efforts exposed both the realities and tensions that have long char-
acterized higher education in the United States. If the ivory tower image
of the American college and university was ever anything other than a
caricature, suggesting as it did a complete indifference by both the faculty
and the curriculum to the problems of the workaday world and a strict
1. See, e.g., J. HYATT, C. SHULMAN, & A. SANTIAGO, R.EoLLOcATIoN: STRAT,
EGIES FOR EFFECTIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1984); G. KELER, AcADEmc STAT-
EGY: THE MANAGEMENT REVOLUTION IN AMERIcAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1983); J.
MINGLE, CHALLENGES Or RETRENCHMENT (1981).
2. By 1980, thirty-five states had a single state agency for coordinating
higher education. EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES REPORT, No. 134, CHA,
LENGE: CooRDInAToIN AND GovwRNANcE IN THE 80's, at 9 (1980). For the perspective
of a state legislator on the need for state coordination of higher education, see
Faxon, The Need for Constitutional Reform of Michigan's Higher Education System,
1983 DET. C.L. REv. 1209.
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immunity from the influences and interests of public policy makers and
"practical" people, by the last quarter of the 19th century it hardly described
the partnership that had emerged between higher education and the society
of which it was very much a part. The partnership was especially evidenced
by the way in which colleges and universities were beginning to secure a
substantial part of their funding and by the diversified purposes they were
increasingly attempting to serve through specialized disciplines and pro-
fessional programs.' The federal Land Grant (Morrill) Act4 of 1862 did
piot simply advance this partnership; the act symbolized the already de-
veloping understanding in the United States that higher education, whether
"public" or "private," was as much worldly as it was unworldly in its
responsibilities.
That this partnership between higher education ansl the larger society
entailed costs, as well as benefits, was probably as predictable as it was
inevitable. In the case of private colleges and universities, major gifts and
donations not only implied the privilege of membership on and access to
the governing boards but also presented opportunities to shape the con-
figuration, if not the content, of the institution's teaching and research
missions. In the case of the public colleges and universities, the public
generally, and legislators specifically, could similarly expect, in exchange
for periodic appropriations from public funds, a role in influencing gov-
erning boards and affecting the choices of programs to be offered and
facilities to be established.
To this collaboration between higher education and the larger society
American colleges and universities typically brought a set of balancing
principles, as fundamental in their importance as they were imprecise in
their application. Heading the list were academic freedom and political
neutrality, the first suggesting considerable, if not absolute, control by
individual faculty members of thp content of their courses and the focus
pf their research, and the second, the inappropriateness, and ultimately
the dysfunctionality, of the institution's deliberately attempting to foist
upon either its students, its faculty, or anyone else the values of a particular
partisan cause or political doctrine.5 The surest guarantee that these prin-
ciples would be honored in the partnership between higher education and
the American public would be, of course, in their acceptance by those
who directly participated in the partnership. But institutional arrangements
can sometimes facilitate principled behavior, and one of the arrangements
that attracted attention, in the 19th century, as legal structures were de-
veloped to secure a continuing relationship between the state and higher
education was that of granting constitutional status to public universities.
3. B. BERELSON, GRADUATE EDUCATION iN Tim UNITED STATES 9-16 (1960).
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-05, 307, 308 (1982).
5. See, e.g., D. BoK, BEYOND Tm IVORY TOWER: SociAL REsPoNsIrLrrms
OF Tm MODERN UNIvEsrrY 3-7 (1982).
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Its purpose was to provide the university, and especially the governing
board, a measure of independent power to counter that which the legislature
would have over the university as a result of the anticipated dependency
of the public university on periodic appropriations of state funds.
Constitutional status for a public university in the United States has
always had two meanings; although they are compatible, they are distin-
guishable. It is possible for a public university to have constitutional status
simply due to a state constitutional provision mandating the university's
establishment or perpetuation. Judged by the language of the state con-
stitutions currently in effect in the United States, at least twenty-one states
appear to accord one or more of their public universities this type of
constitutional status. 6 In starkest terms, this type of constitutional status
means that the legal termination of the university is beyond the reach of
statutory law; a constitutional amendment would be necessary to "dises-
tablish" the university.
The second meaning of constitutional status describes a sub-set of the
constitutionally established universities. In this sense of constitutional status,
university governing boards and state higher education governing boards
receive direct grants of power, in some cases without any language of
qualification and in other cases with elaborations that could arguably be
interpreted either as qualifications or as illustrations of the powers granted.
The number of states that currently provide constitutional status to one
or more of the public universities, in the second sense of the term, is the
subject of some disagreement. 7 Variations among the states in the devel-
opment of the case law, usage, and judicial construction of the relevant
constitutional provisions make tentative, at best, any precise calculation.
As many as sixteen states might qualify as having university or higher
education governing boards which have effectively received grants of power
directly from state constitutional provisions.8
6. ALA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 264-67; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, §§ 2-3; CAL.
CONST. art. IX, § 9; CoLO. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; CONN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 2;
HAw. CoNsT. art. X, §§ 5-6; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 10; LA. CONsT. art. VIII,§ 7; MASS. CONST. art. V; MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5; MINN. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 9(b); Miss. CONST. art. VIII, § 213-A; Mo. CoNsT. art. IX, § 9(b); NEB. CONST.
art. VII, § 10; NEv. CONST. art. XI, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 11; OIaA.
CONST. art. XIII, § 8; S.D. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 10;
UTAH CONST. art. X, § 4; WYo. CONST. art. 7, § 15.
7. L. GLENNY & T. DALGISH, PUBLIC UNIVERsIEs, STATE AGENCIES, AND
THE LAW: CoNsrTuTONAL AUTONOMY IN DECLINE 3-7 (1973); cf. Beckham, Con-
stitutionally Autonomous Higher Education Governance: A Proposed Amendment
to the Florida Constitution, 30 U. FLA. L. Rv. 543, 545-46 (1978); Horowitz,
The Autonomy of the University of California Under the State Constitution, 25
UCLA L. REv. 23, 24-25 (1977).
8. Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota. For decisions affirming constitutionally derived power
[Vol. 54
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That the University of Missouri is a constitutionally established uni-
versity is beyond argument; on this point, both the language of the state
constitution and judicial confirmation of the meaning of the language
permit no doubt.9 It has not always been equally clear to certain com-
mentators, however, that the University of Missouri governing board, the
Board of Curators, derives power directly from the state constitution. In
spite of constitutional language, first appearing in the 1875 Missouri Con-
stitution and continued in 1945 in the present Missouri Constitution, that
vests "the government of the university" in the Board of Curators, some
commentators conclude that judicial construction has effectively foreclosed
the use of this language as an independent source of power. 10 This Article
argues, to the contrary, that Missouri case law supports the conclusion
that the constitutional grant of power to the Board of Curators authorizes
it to act in the absence of enabling legislation. The more troublesome issue
which this Article also examines is whether the constitutional grant of
power serves additionally as a bar to statutory regulation of the University
of Missouri.
II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNIVERSIrY OF MIssoURI
A. Pre-constitutional Status, 1839-1875
Under the March 6, 1820 Act 1 of Congress enabling Missouri to seek
statehood, the state agreed to establish and sustain a "seminary of learning."
Some 40,000 acres of land were deeded to the state for the purpose of
of such governing boards in Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota, see infra note 104. In the case of Missouri, see infra notes 39-46,
57-77, 91-102 and accompanying text. For Louisiana, see Board of Regents v.
Board of Trustees, 491 So. 2d 399 (La. Ct. App. 1986). In the case of North
Dakota, there is as yet no appellate court decision affirming constitutionally derived
power for the state's Board of Higher Education, although the wording of art.
XIV, § 3 of the North Dakota Constitution, placing "control" of the state university
and other state supported educational institutions under the Board, lends itself to
an interpretation that power is thereby constitutionally granted to the Board. See,
e.g., Crockett, Constitutional Autonomy and the North Dakota State Board of
Higher Education, 54 N.D.L. Rv. 529 (1978). Utah is an example of a state in
which the state university and the agricultural college are constitutionally established
without their governing boards thereby deriving a constitutional grant of power.
See University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348
(1956).
9. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
10. L. GLENNY & T. DALGISH, supra note 7, at 7, 37; Beckham, supra note
7, at 546-47; see also H. EDwARDs & V. NoRDiN, HIGaER EDUCATION AND Tn
LAW 57 (1979) (referring to the University of Missouri as a statutory university).
11. 3 Stat. 545 (1813-23).
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funding the institution.1 2 Article VI of the 1820 Missouri Constitution
authorized this fund to be used for supporting a "university for the
promotion of literature and of the arts and sciences." It was not until
1839, however, that the state, through statutory enactment,' 3 legally created
the University. Providing for "the institution and support of a State
University and for the government of Colleges and Academies," the 1839
Act established a "seminary fund" from the proceeds and sales of public
lands, and authorized a university whose "government" was to be vested
in a "board of curators.' ' 4 Article II of the 1839 Act characterized the
University as a "body politic," to be known as the Curators of the
University of Missouri.' 5 The Board of Curators was to "have power to
make such by-laws or ordinances, rules and regulations, as they shall judge
most expedient for the accomplishment of the trust reposed in them, and
for the government of their officers, and to secure their accountability." '' 6
Powers specifically enumerated for the Board of Curators included those
of conferring "by diploma under their common seal, on any person whom
they may judge worthy thereof, such degrees above that of master of arts,
as are known to and usually granted by any college or university.' 7 In
1839 the Missouri General Assembly also directed that a competition be
held among six central Missouri counties for the site of the University;'
this competition resulted in the selection of Boone County.
Present supporters of the University of Missouri who are continually
disappointed by what they believe to be a level of state funding incom-
mensurate with the responsibilities and potential of the University might
find solace, however slight, in the even more desperate financial plight of
the University during its formative years. During the first twenty-eight years
of its existence, the University received no appropriated funds from the
General Assembly. 19 Throughout this period the University depended entirely
upon other sources for both its operating and capital budgets. Principal
sources were the gifts of money and land generated in 1839 by the Boone
County campaign to secure the University's location, annual student fees,
occasional private donations, and the proceeds and revenues from public
lands which had been dedicated in 1820 to a state "seminary of learning." 20
12. Id. at 547.
13. 1836-40 Missouri Laws 173.
14. Id. at 173-76.
15. Id. at 176.
16. Id. at 177.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 184-87.
19. Data concerning the sources of University of Missouri financing during
its early years are found in F. STEPEMNS, A HISTORY OF Tm UNmsrrY OF MIssoURi
53-59 (1962); J. Vmus, THE UNrvsrrY oF MIssouiu: A CEnNrrEN L HISTORY 112-
13, 256-57 (1939).
20. F. STBPHENS, supra note 19, at 14-18, 53-59.
[Vol. 54
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In 1863, some 350,000 acres of land provided under terms of the Morrill
Act2' and dedicated to supporting programs related to agriculture and the
"mechanic arts" augmented these funding sources. Efforts made during
the 1865 Missouri Constitutional Convention to secure, through constitu-
tional language, a tighter obligation upon the part of the General Assembly
to provide financial support to the University were of little consequence.'2
The General Assembly's first appropriation of any funds to the University
occurred in 1867; the legislature approved a one time allocation of $10,000
to help restore the university presidential home, which had been damaged
by fire.23 Soon thereafter, however, the General Assembly began approving
modest annual appropriations to the University; by the time of the 1875
Missouri Constitutional Convention, the annual state appropriation amounted
to $16,000.2
B. The Granting of Constitutional Status: The Constitutional
Convention of 1875
As a matter of public policy, the state's obligation to provide "free
public schooling" had already been established in pre-Civil War Missouri
and appears not to have been seriously challenged in the 1875 Constitutional
Convention. Disagreements about the specifics and magnitude of the ob-
ligation, however, were clearly evident; even the most vigorous supporters
of public education conceded that the state's public debt, aggravated by
the demise of the soft currency movement and the Panic of 1873, cautioned
against writing financial commitments into the new constitution that could
not be honored. 25 Certain delegates viewed a commitment of public funds
for higher education to be especially ill-advised, both for financial reasons
and as a matter of educational philosophy. One delegate cited the support
of no less an authority on the philosophy of higher education than President
Charles Eliot of Harvard University to try to persuade the delegates that
higher education is best left to private institutions. 26
21. 7 U.S.C. §§ 301-05 (1982).
22. The 1865 Missouri Constitution simply provided in art. IX, § 4 that
"[t]he General Assembly shall also establish and maintain a state university, with
departments for instruction in teaching, in agriculture, and in natural science, as
soon as the public school fund will permit." The delegates at the 1865 Constitutional
Convention reportedly refused to support a resolution specifying the University
already established at Columbia as the state university recognized in the language
of art. IX, § 4. See F. STm'NS, supra note 19, at 202; J. VIEs, supra note 19,
at 116, 123.
23. F. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 204.
24. 9 DEBATES OF THE MIssoURI CONsTrrmoNAL CONVENTION OF 1875, at
51 (1942).
25. Id. at 39, 170, 188, 200-202, 264.
26. Id. at 78-83.
1989]
7
Bunn: Bunn: Constitutional Power
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
On July 8, 1875, the Committee on Education submitted to the Missouri
Constitutional Convention its recommended provision concerning the State
university:
The General Assembly shall maintain the state university now established
with its present departments. The government of the university shall be
vested in a Board of Curators, to consist of nine members, to be appointed
by the Governor, and the Superintendent of Public Schools shall be ex-
officio a member of the Board, but shall have no vote in the proceedings.2
The Committee chairman's presentation makes it reasonably certain
that the principal purpose of this recommended provision was to secure
regularized state financial support for the University at Columbia. In his
extended remarks, the chairman stressed the state's "pledge of faith" to
the University, first given by the state as one of the conditions of statehood,
renewed when the state accepted lands and donations from the people of
Boone County in the competition for the site of the University, and
reaffirmed when the state received the federal grant of public lands in
1863 to support agricultural and mechanical arts programs as parts of the
University.28 The chairman noted that in its entire history the University
had received an amount in state support significantly less than what Boone
County alone had contributed and some $6,000 less than the combined
sums appropriated to the four statutory teachers' colleges located in various
regions of the state.29 Placing the state's commitment to the maintenance
of the University in a constitutional provision was no more than what a
number of other states had done, the chairman concluded, citing his
knowledge of states such as Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia.3 0
Dominating the floor debate on the Committee of Education's rec-
ommended provision were five issues, evidenced both by the several efforts
to amend the Committee's recommended version and by statements from
delegates either supporting or opposing such efforts:
(1) What was the nature of the financial commitment intended by the
provision? The committee chairman assured the delegates that the "main-
tenance" clause was not intended to be self-executing as to a specific
amount.3
(2) How much discretion, if any, would the provision permit the General
Assembly in singling out specific departments for a denial of funding? The
Committee chairman, joined by other delegates, concluded that the wording
of the recommended provision proscribed legislative abolition of any existing
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 40-51.
29. Id. at 52.
30. Id. at 174-76.
31. Id. at 172, 174.
[Vol. 54
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departments and divisions of the University.32 The possibility that General
Assembly might later want to add, by statutory enactments, to the existing
complement of departments and divisions received only a momentary and
inconclusive comment from floor. 33
(3) Would it not, nonetheless, be a wise precaution to refer specifically
in the provision to existing departments and divisions of the University by
name, to protect them against later efforts in the General Assembly to
abolish them? The Committee chairman counseled the delegates against
this approach, suggesting, instead, that the language of the proposed pro-
vision was sufficient to accomplish this purpose. 34
(4) Should not the provision contain language specifically mandating
cooperation between the University and the public school system? The
Committee chairman reported that the Committee saw value in simply
structuring an "advisory" relationship, one by which the president of the
University would serve as a non-voting member of the state Board of
Education and the state superintendent of public schools would have a
comparable position on the Board of Curators.35 In the version the con-
vention finally approved, no formal structuring of a relationship between
the University and the public school system was attempted.
(5) Should not the legislature, at least through the Senate, share re-
sponsibility with the governor in appointment members to the Board of
Curators? The Committee, the chairman explained, had deliberately excluded
the legislature from the selection of curators to shield the University from
"the whirlpool of politics" '36 and "the destroying influence of partisan
politics." ' 37 On this point, the Committee lost; in the version approved by
the Convention, the governor received the power to appoint curators only
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
For the purpose of judging the intent of the framers in granting
constitutional status to the Board of Curators, a significant omission in
the 1875 Constitutional Convention debates was its failure to discuss the
phrase, recommended in the Committee's proposal and subsequently ap-
proved by the Convention, that "the government of the university shall
be vested in a Board of Curators ... ." In his initial remarks, introducing
to the delegates the entire provision, the Committee chairman merely noted,
in an apparent reference to the 1839 Act originally establishing the Uni-
versity, that this phrase embodied existing law.3" No occasion arose during
32. Id. at 204, 206-210, 212, 213-14.
33. Id. at 208.
34. Id. at 212, 214.
35. Id. at 150.
36. Id. at 293-94.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 32.
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the floor debates requiring the chairman's explanation of the Committee's
specific intent in using this phrase.
Becoming effective on November 30, 1875, the Missouri Constitution
provided in Article XI, § 5:
The General Assembly shall, whenever its Public School Fund will permit,
and the actual necessity of the same may require, aid and maintain the
State University, now established, with its present departments. The gov-
ernment of the State University shall be vested in a Board of Curators,
to consist of nine members, to be appointed by the Governor, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The present Missouri Constitution (1945) rearranges but reproduces in
its Article IX, § 9 much of the earlier language:
(a). State University-government by board of curators-number and
appointment. The government of the state university shall be vested in a
board of curators consisting of nine members appointed by the governor,
by and with the advice and consent of the senate.
(b). Maintenance of state university and other educational institutions.
The general assembly shall adequately maintain the state university and
such other educational institutions as it may deem necessary.
III. STATE EX REL. HEIMBERGER v. BoARD oF CURATORS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MSSOURI3 9
Decided in 1916, Heimberger remains central to any analysis of the
constitutional power of the Board of Curators. In the case the Missouri
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the question of the meaning
of Article XI, § 5 of the 1875 constitution and applied its interpretation
of the provision in resolving a conflict between the Board of Curators and
the General Assembly over a fundamental academic policy matter. Con-
siderable confusion persists about both the reasoning and the ruling in
Heimberger and their implications for the constitutional power of the Board
of Curators °40
A. Facts, Reasoning, and Decision
Heimberger was a writ of mandamus proceeding to compel the Board
of Curators to obey a 1915 Act4' of the General Assembly requiring the
39. 268 Mo. 598, 188 S.W. 128 (1916) (en banc).
40. See, e.g., L. GrmrY & T. DAL YsH, supra note 7, at 37 (concluding
that Heimberger and subsequent litigation "clearly identify the University of Missouri
as not among those universities possessed of constitutional status"); Beckham, supra
note 7, at 546-47 (concluding that Heimberger marks the beginning of the erosion
of "constitutional autonomy" for the University of Missouri).
41. Mo. REv. STAT. § 172.450 (1986).
370 [Vol. 54
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University of Missouri to provide through the School of Mines and Met-
allurgy at Rolla courses and degrees in general science and in several
engineering sub-fields. The Curators challenged the validity of the statute,
arguing that Article XI, § 5, by vesting the "government" of the University
of Missouri in the Board, precluded the General Assembly from requiring
through statutory enactment the addition of departments, courses of study,
and academic degree programs at the University.
For purposes of reaching the principal question, the Missouri Supreme
Court separated art. XI, § 5 into two parts. The first part, the "main-
tenance" clause represented by the first sentence in art. XI, § 5, the court
held inapplicable to the dispute. The court construed this part of art. XI,
§ 5 simply to mean that the Missouri Constitution mandated the continuation
of the University, so that, for example, the General Assembly could not
by statute validly "disestablish" the University in its entirety or "dises-
tablish" any of the University's departments which had been in existence
in 1875 when the Constitution became effective. 42
The key to whether the statute was binding on the Board of Curators,
the court concluded, was to be found in the meaning of "government,"
contained in the second sentence of art. XI, § 5. Up to this point in its
analysis, the Heimberger court followed the argument made by the Curators'
counsel. But the sweep of the argument tended toward exclusivity:
Counsel do not mince words. In plain language they state their contention
to be that the quoted words [government of the state university shall be
vested in a board of curators] constitute the board of curators a separate
and distinct department of the State Government, over which the General
Assembly has no power and with which it has practically nothing to do
except to make such appropriations as it deems proper under that part
of Section 5 which deals with appropriations as above pointed out.4 3
The treatment accorded the Board of Regents of the University of
Michigan in Sterling v. Regents of the University of Michigan" apparently
encouraged the Curators to make the argument of exclusive power. The
Curators' counsel cited Sterling in support of his argument4 and the Missouri
Supreme Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion justifying its
rejection of the Sterling reasoning. 46
Sterling was a mandamus proceeding brought against the Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan to compel the Regents to obey an
1895 statute requiring the University of Michigan to discontinue its medical
school at Ann Arbor and to establish, instead, a medical school in Detroit.
The Regents argued that the power granted to them by the Michigan
42. 268 Mo. at 608, 620, 188 S.W. at 130, 134.
43. Id. at 613-14, 188 S.W. at 131-32.
44. 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896).
45. 268 Mo. at 603; 188 S.W. at 133.
46. Id. at 615-18, 188 S.W. at 132-33.
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Constitution precluded the state legislature from lawfully issuing binding
instructions about the establishment and location of departments and schools
of the University of Michigan. 47 The Regents had accompanied their con-
stitutional argument with policy arguments stressing the political and ed-
ucational implications of permitting the state legislature to override the
judgment of the Board of Regents as to the appropriate scope and location
of the University's instructional programs. 48 Agreeing with the Board of
Regents' interpretation of art. XII, § 8 of the Michigan Constitution, which
provided that "The board of regents shall have the general supervision of
the University, and the direction and control of all expenditures from the
University interest fund," the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed an earlier
decision construing broadly the constitutional power of the Regents. 49 It
noted the premier position which the University of Michigan had been able
to achieve among "the most complete, and the best known institutions of
learning in the world," 50 and recalled the struggle of the University of
Michigan in its formative years under "legislative supervision."', The court
further cited an 1840 report of a Michigan legislature select committee
condemning legislative control of the University, 2 interpreted the intent of
the framers of the 1850 Constitution as seeking to correct the problems
identified in the select committee report,53 pointed to the "plain" meaning
of the language used in art. XIII, § 8,1 4 and emphasized that the people
of Michigan expected to secure accountability of the Board of Regents not
through legislative controls but through the popular electoral process em-
ployed for selecting members of the Board.5 The ruling of the Sterling
court was broad and explicit:
Now, in the face of the facts that the regents have for 46 years exercised
such control, and openly asserted its exclusive right to do so; that the
courts have refused to compel them to comply with the acts of the
legislature; that this court held in Weinberg v. Regents, 97 Mich. 246, 56
N.W. 605 [Mich., 1893] that they were a constitutional body, upon whom
was conferred this exclusive control; and in the face of this plain con-
stitutional provision,-this court is now asked to hold that the regents are
mere ministerial officers, endowed with the sole power to register the will
of the legislature, and to supervise such branches and departments as any
legislature may see fit to provide for. By the power claimed, the legislature
may completely dismember the university, and remove every vestige of it
from the city of Ann Arbor. It is no argument to say there is no danger
47. 110 Mich. at 372, 68 N.W. at 253.
48. Id. at 371-72, 68 N.W. at 253.
49. Id. at 380-82, 68 N.W. at 256-57 (citing Weinberg v. Regents of the
Univ., 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605 (1893)).
50. 110 Mich. at 377, 68 N.W. at 255.
51. Id. at 374, 68 N.W. at 254.
52. Id. at 375-77, 68 N.W. at 255-56.
53. Id. at 377, 68 N.W. at 255.
54. Id. at 380, 68 N.W. at 256.
55. Id. at 379, 68 N.W. at 256.
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of such a result. The question is one of power, and who shall say that
such a result may not flow? 56
The Curators' reliance on Sterling was unavailing. The Missouri Supreme
Court explained why: (1) While the Michigan Supreme Court had partly
relied on extrinsic, historical evidence in construing the Michigan consti-
tutional provision, the Missouri Supreme Court viewed this mode of con-
struction for the Missouri constitutional provision to be unnecessary and,
therefore, inappropriate. Instead, the court looked for guidance to the
"natural signification" of the language in art. XI, § 557 (2) "Practical
construction" in Missouri pointed to a different understanding in Missouri
about the relationship between the legislature and the state university. For
some 40 years following the adoption of the 1875 Missouri Constitution,
the Board of Curators, the court noted, had consistently obeyed and
observed, without court challenge, statutory directives, including at least
two statutory directives establishing departments and faculty chairs.5 1 (3)
In contrast with the Michigan Supreme Court in Sterling, the Missouri
Supreme Court in Heimberger was being asked to interpret the constitutional
power of the university on first impression, unbound by previous court
decisions on the subject. 9 (4) The language in the Missouri Constitution,
by giving the Curators no specific control over funds, was less explicitly
an exclusive grant of power than the language in the Michigan Constitution 0
(5) Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court used a "questionable" rule of
construction when it inferred that the framers of the Michigan Constitution,
by using language to describe the Regents' power that differed from the
language used to describe the power of municipalities and other corporate
bodies, must have intended a special and exclusive power for the Board
of Regents. 6'
Rejecting, therefore, Sterling as having no authority, and denying the
need for extrinsic evidence, the Missouri Supreme Court sought the aid of
dictionaries in determining the meaning of "government" as found in art.
XI, § 5. Consulting the Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia and Webster's
New International Dictionary, the court discovered agreement on such terms
as "direction," "regulation," "guidance," and "control" for the definition
of "government. ' 62 None of these terms, the court reasoned, suggested
the "idea of creation, origination, or the like, in whole or in part.1 63 It
follows, the court stated, illustrating the full consequences of its discovery,
56. Id. at 380, 68 N.W. at 256.
57. 268 Mo. at 620-21, 188 S.W. at 133-34.
58. Id. at 617, 188 S.W. at 133.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 618, 188 S.W. at 133; Sterling, 110 Mich. at 382-83, 68 N.W.
at 257-58.
62. 268 Mo. at 620, 188 S.W. at 133-34.
63. Id. at 620-21, 188 S.W. at 134.
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that "[tihe vesting of the powers of government in the legislative, executive,
and judicial departments implies no attempt to vest in either [sic] magistracy
any power to add to the state itself." 64
Based on such reasoning, the Missouri Supreme Court formulated its
ruling:
If the word [government] vests no power to create or originate departments
in the board of curators, it is manifest it gives rise to no implication
excluding such powers from the field of the General Assembly's authority,
and we cannot strike down the Act of March 23, 1915, on the theory
that the Constitution commits to the board of curators alone the power
of building as well as governing a university. 5
Thus, under the theory that power not constitutionally denied to the
state legislature is reserved to the legislature, the Missouri Supreme Court
held in Heimberger that the General Assembly could validly require, through
statutory enactment, the Board of Curators to establish specific departments
and programs of instruction at the University of Missouri." To buttress
its ruling, the court pointed to the appropriations power of the General
Assembly. In this part of its opinion, dictum surely because no appropriation
statute was at issue in Heimberger and the residual theory had disposed
of the question before the court, the Missouri Supreme Court connected
the establishment of new departments, courses of study, and degree pro-
grams to a presumptively indispensable need for legislatively appropriated
funds to effect the establishment. 7 In making this connection, the court,
without explanation, relaxed its original position that extrinsic evidence was
unnecessary in interpreting the constitutional grant of power of the Board
of Curators:
Neither at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1875 nor since
has the State University had any income, independent of appropriations
by the General Assembly, which bore any considerable ratio to the sums
necessary for its maintenance. It must have been apparent to the framers
of the Constitution that if the people adopted the Constitution, the Univ-
ersity's development and growth, so far as money was required therefor,
would depend upon appropriations from the State Treasury .... Having
thus necessarily left in the General Assembly the complete control of the
funds available and necessary for the development of the University, it is
hardly reasonable to give the language of section 5, of article 11, a meaning
which can be given no actual force and effect, so far as concerns the
establishment of new departments and courses of study, unless that force
and effect are given by the General Assembly through appropriations for
those purposes. We assume it was intended the University should grow.6"
64. Id. at 621, 188 S.W. at 134.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 620-21, 188 S.W. at 134.
67. Id. at 621-23, 188 S.W. at 134.
68. Id. at 622, 188 S.W. at 134.
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On both semantic and historical grounds, the reasoning of the Heim-
berger court is less than convincing. The major curiosity of the reasoning
is in the court's construction of "government." Although justifying its
definition of "government" through the use of dictionaries, the court
actually introduced a doctrinal argument: it asserts that a government usurps
its legitimate power whenever it engages in acts of "origination" or "cre-
ation." Whatever the inspiration of this doctrine, reconciling it with the
innumerable acts of creation by governments at all levels in the United
States since the founding of the nation would appear to be a bizarre revision
of history. The court's apparent purpose was to find a way to deny the
Board of Curators' claim to an exclusive grant of power.
As noted below, courts in other jurisdictions have found several ways
to find qualifications to the constitutional grant of power to university
governing boards, but none has chosen the curious path the Heimberger
court took. 69 The reasoning in Heimberger rejects the idea that adding new
programs periodically at a university is a normal faculty and administration
exercise of their responsibility to respond to the changing educational needs
of the students and of the community which the university serves. At the
core of the doctrine invoked in Heimberger is the confusion of the juris-
dictional power of a government with the services that a government might
provide within its jurisdictional power; without this distinction, the court
treats new services as new powers. Fortunately for the credibility of the
Missouri Supreme Court, it was not trying to apply its doctrine to test
the validity of a state statute mandating the establishment of a new state
agency or program of service; under the Heimberger doctrine, such acts
of "origination" would be usurpations of existing power, or, to use the
words of the court, they would be to "add to the state itself."170 But by
applying its doctrine to the state university, the court found a basis for
denying the claim of the Board of Curators to an exclusive grant of power.
Even if the court's doctrinal reasoning is confined to the issue of the
constitutional power of the Board of Regents, and is not extended to other
governmental units in the state, the court created for itself a practical
dilemma of considerable importance. If the Board of Curators' power
permits no originating or creating of programs, were not all academic
departments, courses of study, and degree programs which the Board of
Curators established since the adoption of the 1875 Constitution the fruits
of usurpations of power? The court chose to ignore the question.
Logic also fails to support the court's dictum that the power to create
new programs and departments within the University is an inescapable
adjunct of the legislature's appropriations power. Use of non-appropriated
funds has always been an option available to the University to underwrite
69. See supra notes 39-68 and accompanying text.
70. 268 Mo. at 621, 188 S.W. at 134.
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new programs. While a public university expects and prefers to secure
increased appropriations whenever it undertakes additional responsibilities,
to assert a necessary connection between the appropriation of new state
funds and new university programs is asking logic to demonstrate a con-
nection that more correctly rests on university preference. In the absence
of such appropriations, the university might still find it financially possible
to initiate a new program, especially if the university itself determines, as
did the University of Missouri at the time of Heimberger and as it still
does, its student fees and tuition charges.
Historical experience challenges the court's reasoning that the framers
of the 1875 Constitution must have intended that the legislature prevail
over the Board of Curators in making decisions about which degree and
instructional programs should be provided at the University. With few
exceptions, the creation and expansion of the University's programs of
instruction between 1839 and 1875 were done without either legislative
mandate or legislative appropriations. 71 The 1875 Constitutional Convention
debates provide no evidence that the framers intended to alter or limit this
historic practice. The Committee on Education's concerns in the 1875
Constitutional Convention were not that the Board of Curators was too
powerful but that the programmatic efforts of the University were unre-
warded by the General Assembly. Contrary to the one asserted in Heim-
berger, an interpretation closer to the motivations of the Committee on
Education, in recommending the constitutional provision concerning the
state university, is that it sought to bind the General Assembly to an
understanding that, as the Board of Curators continued to exercise its past
practice of establishing programs responding to the needs to the state, the
University could expect to receive at least more financial support from the
state than it had been receiving. 72 In any event, to state, as the court did,
that at the time of the adoption of the 1875 Constitution the University
had no income, "independent of appropriations by the General Assembly,
which bore any considerable ratio to the sums necessary for its maintenance" 73
simply bears no relationship to the facts; during most of the period between
1839 and 1875, the University depended entirely upon non-appropriated
funds. 74
B. Interpreting Heimberger
Commentators over-generalize when they interpret Heimberger to mean
that the Board of Curators of the University of Missouri has effectively
71. See F. STEPHENS, supra note 19, at 39-118.
72. On this key issue, whether the state should be constitutionally bound
to "maintain" the University, the convention voted favorably 38 to 17, with 13
abstaining or absent. 9 DEBATES OF r MissouRI CONSTrrTiONAL CONVENTION OF
1875, at 164, 204 (1942).
73. 268 Mo. at 622, 188 S.W. at 134.
74. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also 9 DEBATES OP THE
MIssoUiU CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION Or 1875, at 48-51 (1942).
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lost whatever constitutional grant of power initially intended for it by the
framers of the 1875 Missouri Constitution. 75 In analyzing the constitutional
power granted to a university governing board, one must distinguish between
the power to act in the absence of statutory authorization and the power
to act contrary to a statute;76 a governing board that is judicially denied
the latter is not by that decision also denied the former. As long as a
governing board retains the former it has a legal power of governance that
remains substantially different from that of the governing boards of public
colleges and universities which must look entirely to enabling legislation
for their authority to act. Heimberger does not stand for the proposition
that the constitutional grant of power to the Board of Curators is a nullity;
to the contrary, the Heimberger court conceded that the Board received
power through art. XI, § 5.77 The question which the Curators posed to
the Missouri Supreme Court in Heimberger was whether the constitutional
grant of power to the Board precluded entry by the legislature into the
governance of the University. To this question the court answered in the
negative, at least for purposes of deciding which academic programs,
degrees, and departments were to be added to the University. It is this
denial of autonomy for the Board of Curators that commentators apparently
have in mind when they assert that, as a result of Heimberger, the University
lost its status as a constitutional university. This assertion, by ignoring the
distinction between the power to act without statutory authorization and
the power to prevail over a conflicting statute, results in an overly-broad
interpretation of the Heimberger ruling.
Heimberger permits three observations: (1) measured against the sweep
of the claim made by the Board of Curators to an exclusive power to
govern the University, Heimberger was a defeat for the Board of Curators;
(2) considering the centrality to any university of the conflict in Heimberger
between the Board and the General Assembly - determining which academic
programs and degrees to be added-the court's finding that this area is
open to a binding decision by the legislature did not bode well for any
future Board of Curators' effort to secure judicial affirmation of autonomy
in any area of university governance. After all, if the Board had to share
with the legislature the power to make policy defining the University's
academic purposes, was it not even more likely that the Board would be
denied autonomy in determining policies concerning the non-academic side
of the University's operations? (3) compared with the line sharply drawn
by the Michigan Supreme Court in Sterling as a barrier against statutory
75. See supra note 40.
76. The importance of this distinction for analyzing also the distribution of
power between the state and the home rule municipality is demonstrated in West-
brook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33 Mo.
L. REv. 45 (1968).
77. 268 Mo. at 621, 188 S.W. at 134.
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regulation of the University of Michigan, the line drawn by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Heimberger is blurred, permitting legislative entry in at
least one area of University of Missouri governance and revealing no general
principle or formula for deciding whether legislative entry in still other
areas is also permissible.
IV. CASE LAW AFrER HmBERGER
Since Heimberger, Missouri appellate courts on six occasions have
addressed issues requiring them to interpret either the legal status of the
University of Missouri (legally described as "The Curators of the University
of Missouri") or the constitutional power of the Board of Curators. In
two of these cases, Clark v. McBaine,71 decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1923, and Todd v. Curators of the University of Missouri,79
decided by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1941, the court confirmed the
legal status of the University as a public corporation. The result in Clark
was that, since the University and its departments are "proper and legitimate
subjects of comment through the public press," plaintiff had no cause of
action in a libel suit against certain of his faculty colleagues for their
comments in a letter published in a newspaper concerning plaintiff's dis-
charge from the faculty. 0 In Todd the court held that the University shared
in the common law immunity accorded all Missouri public corporations
against tort liability.81
Neither decision serves to clarify questions about the constitutional
power of the Board of Curators, although one could infer from the reasoning
in both that the Missouri Supreme Court saw no distinction between the
University of Missouri and any other public or quasi-public corporation
under Missouri law. On four occasions, however, Missouri courts have
dealt more directly with questions concerning the constitutional power of
the Board of Curators. Two involved the applicability of state statutes to
the University and its governing board and two examined art. IX, § 9(a)
as a source of authority for the Board of Curators in the absence of
enabling legislation.
A. Statutory Regulation of the University of Missouri
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Public Service Employees
Local No. 4582 presented the question whether the Missouri Public Sector
78. 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W. 428 (1923).
79. 347 Mo. 460, 147 S.W.2d 1063 (1941).
80. 299 Mo. at 93, 252 S.W. at 432.
81. 347 Mo. at 464-65, 147 S.W.2d at 1064.
82. 520 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. 1975) (en banc).
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Labor Law3 applied to the University of Missouri in its relations with its
non-academic employees. In answering the question affirmatively, the Mis-
souri Supreme Court reaffirmed its reasoning in an earlier decision,84 holding
that the statute was applicable to municipal corporations, that the statute
was a valid means to facilitate the exercise of Missouri public sector
employees' constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and petition, and
that employers in the public sector -though obligated by the statute to
meet and confer with employees-retained their pre-existing prerogative to
decide their employees' terms and conditions of employment.' 5 Assuming
without discussion that the University of Missouri is indistinguishable, at
least for purposes of this statute, from other public employers in the state,
the court held that the statute equally applied to the University. Although
the court added the caveat that it might have to reconsider its decision if
the General Assembly, in future action, further restricted public sector
employers in their power to determine the terms and conditions of em-
ployment, 6 it is clear that the caveat was stated not for the purpose of
suggesting a special constitutional protection for the University from stat-
utory regulation. Rather, the caveat indicated that under the state consti-
tution all of the state's public sector employers might be protected from
legislative enactments further encroaching upon the prerogative of public
employers to determine terms and conditions of employment of their em-
ployees.
Decided in 1983 by the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District, Tribune Publishing Co. v. Curators of the University of Missouri7
involved a suit brought by plaintiff seeking to bring not only the Board
of Curators but also the University's principal administrative officers and
those reporting to these officers within the scope of the Missouri Open
Meetings Law. 8 Acknowledging the broad language used in the statute in
its definition of "public governmental body," to which the statute applied,
the Missouri court of appeals nonetheless reasoned that only the Board of
Curators, and not the several tiers of officers and committees within the
entire university complex, could reasonably be defined as a "public gov-
ernmental body."8 9 The court concluded that the Open Meetings Law applied
to activities of the Board of Curators and to documents and reports which
83. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 105.500-.525 (1986).
84. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
For a discussion of the problems with the reasoning of the Clouse opinion, see
Westbrook, The Use of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Public Sector Labor Law:
Lessons from Cases That Have Perpetuated an Anachronism, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J.
331, 337-43 (1986).
85. 520 S.W.2d at 57-58.
86. Id. at 58.
87. 661 S.W.2d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
88. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 610.010-.030 (1986).
89. 661 S.W.2d at 579-80.
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the Board consulted in conducting its business, but that the statute was
inapplicable to the activities and reports of University officers, groups, and
committees which were not directly related to the discussions and trans-
actions of the Board of Curators. 90
Advocates of the view that the constitutional status of the University
of Missouri shields the University and its governing board from statutory
regulation will not find encouragement in the opinions of either of these
cases. Without even invoking the authority of Heimberger, the courts in
both cases appeared to assume that statutes, otherwise valid, apply to the
University of Missouri and its governing body as they apply to any other
state agency or sub-division of the state. No question was raised, nor was
any addressed, about possible boundaries between areas of University affairs
subject to statutory regulation and areas exclusively within the control of
the Board of Curators.
B. Art. IX. § 9(a) as a Source of Authority
In State ex rel. Curators of the University of Missouri v. McReynolds,91
decided in 1946, the Missouri Supreme Court, for the first time since
Heimberger, examined the meaning of the constitutional provision vesting
the "government" of the University in the Board of Curators. McReynolds
was a mandamus proceeding to test the power of the Board of Curators
to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of financing the construction of
student dormitories. The court reviewed two possible impediments to the
Board's issuing such bonds; one was the absence of an express authorization,
either in the constitution or in statute, for the Board to borrow money
for this purpose and to issue bonds as security; the other was a statute92
requiring the University, in its expenditures, to stay within its appropriated
budget. In rejecting the first of these impediments, the court concluded
that there was an implied authorization for the Board to issue the bonds.
In finding the authorization to be implied, the court relied on several
arguments, combining them to produce the result: (1) without specifically
providing for the use of revenue bonds, the legislature had, by statutory
enactment, 93 authorized the Board of Curators to erect and maintain build-
ings for the use and accommodation of students;94 (2) because of art. IX,
§ 9(a)'s direct grant of power to the Board of Curators and of the
understanding developed of this power as a source of authority in the
absence of enabling legislation, especially in light of the University's access
to non-state and non-tax funds, the Board of Curators of the University
90. Id. at 584.
91. 354 Mo. 1199, 193 S.W.2d 611 (1946).
92. Mo. REv. STAT. § 10791 (1939).
93. Id. § 10810.
94. 354 Mo. at 1204, 193 S.W.2d at 612.
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of Missouri is not subject to as strict a standard of legislative control over
its borrowing practices as are Missouri municipal corporations, which must
rely explicitly on statutory authority to issue revenue bonds;95 (3) holdings
of courts in other jurisdictions support the reasoning that public universities
need not be held to the same standard that is applied to municipal cor-
porations in finding authority to issue revenue bonds.96 The court dismissed,
as inapplicable, the argument that the statutory prohibition of the Univ-
ersity's spending in excess of its annual income prevented the University
from issuing revenue bonds; the purpose of the statute prohibiting deficit
spending, the court reasoned, was to prevent deficits which would result
in claims against state revenues and no such claims could result from the
proposed revenue bonds. 97
In State ex rel. Curators of the University of Missouri v. Neill,9 decided
by the Missouri Supreme Court in 1966, the Board of Curators again
sought a writ of mandamus affirming its power to issue revenue bonds,
this time to construct a parking facility. However, unlike the factual situation
in McReynolds showing the Board of Curators to have statutory authority
for constructing and maintaining dormitories, in Neill the Board could
point to no statute expressly authorizing it to construct and maintain parking
facilities. Because of this factual difference, the Missouri Supreme Court
gave considerably more emphasis in Neill to art. IX, § 9(a) as a source
of implied power. While the court's grant of the writ of mandamus
ultimately rested on both statutory and constitutional construction, each
source was addressed as a basis for the implied power. Since the General
Assembly had granted authority to the Board of Curators to select sites
on which to carry out the functions of the University and to acquire real
estate for such purposes by purchase and condemnation, the court reasoned
that the General Assembly had expressed an intent that the Board of
Curators construct improvements, including parking facilities, on University
property.99 In finding separate support, however, for the Board's implied
power to construct parking facilities on University property, the court
turned to art. IX, § 9(a) and relied upon a contemporary dictionary,
Heimberger, and usage in interpreting the meaning of the clause that vests
the government of the University in the Board of Curators:
The term "government" has been defined as the act or process of governing;
authoritative direction or control, and the office, authority or function of
95. Id. at 1204, 193 S.W.2d at 613.
96. Decisions cited from other jurisdictions were State v. Regents of the
Univ. Sys., 179 Ga. 210, 175 S.E. 567 (1934); Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisors,
176 La. 825, 147 So. 5 (1933); Fanning v. University of Minn., 183 Minn. 222,
236 N.W. 217 (1931); State College Dev. Ass'n v. Nissen, 66 S.D. 287, 281 N.W.
907 (1938).
97. 354 Mo. at 1205, 193 S.W.2d at 613.
98. 397 S.W.2d 666 (Mo. 1966).
99. Id. at 669.
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governing. To govern is to control the workings or operations of, and to
control, guide and regulate Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
These definitions have been approved by the court with respect to the
government of the University. State ex rel. Heimberger v. Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri .... 100
.... It is an admitted fact that for more than twenty-five years the
Curators have been providing parking facilities on its campuses in Columbia
and at Rolla and more recently at St. Louis and Kansas City. The
administrative interpretation given a constitutional or statutory provision
by public officers charged with its execution, while not controlling, is
entitled to consideration, especially in case of doubt or ambiguity.oI
Having thus found an implied power, on the basis of both statutory
and constitutional construction, for the Board of Curators to build and
maintain parking facilities on University property, the court cited Mc-
Reynolds as authority for the additional conclusion that revenue bonds are
a permissible means for implementing this power.' °2
C. Evaluation of the Post-Heimberger Decisions
Without burdening themselves with the task of either explaining or
justifying the curious doctrine of Heimberger that the power of "govern-
ment" does not include the power to create or originate, Missouri courts
have nonetheless continued the lines of development initiated in Heimberger
of conceding, on the one hand, that the University of Missouri Board of
Curators derives power directly from constitutional grant and of denying,
on the other hand, that this grant of power precludes statutory regulation
of the University of Missouri. Although incompatible, if each position is
absolutely maintained, both are easily maintained in the absence of a direct
conflict between an action of the Board of Curators and a statutory
enactment.
Except for the obvious invalidity of Board of Curators' actions that
would otherwise conflict with the federal and Missouri constitutions, art.
IX, § 9(a) authorizes the Board to make decisions without express au-
thorization from the General Assembly. Neill most clearly supports this
proposition, but McReynolds also employs reasoning that includes it. These
cases specifically place the powers to construct parking facilities on Uni-
versity property and to issue revenue bonds to finance construction of
dormitories and parking facilities within the powers implied by art. IX, §
9(a), but the ramifications of this proposition are better appreciated when
account is taken of the courts' invoking usage and administrative practice
as aids in identifying Board actions permissible under art. IX, § 9(a).
Historical usage and administrative practice abundantly evidence Board of
100. Id.
101. Id. at 670.
102. Id. at 671.
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Curator's actions taken over the years, including most of the steps necessary
to expand the University from a single campus to a multi-campus system,
without express statutory authorization.0 3
It is the other dimension of the constitutional grant of power to a
university's governing board, the shielding of the university from the binding
effect of statutory law, which has eluded the University of Missouri in the
case law. In Heimberger's pronouncement that the legislature can mandate
the establishment of new academic programs and Public -Service Employees
Local 45 and Tribune Publishing Co.'s assumptions that statutes such as
the Public Sector Labor Law and the Open Meetings Law are as applicable
to the University of Missouri as they are to other state agencies and
municipal corporations, there is no positive indication from the courts that
the constitutional grant of power to the Board protects some areas of
university governance from statutory regulation. To conclude, however,
simply on the basis of these three opinions that any otherwise valid state
statute is binding on the University of Missouri and its governing board
seems premature. Since Heimberger in 1916, Missouri decisions have avoided
or glossed over the issue. Such avoidance, however, does not typify most
jurisdictions having constitutionally empowered universities.
V. STATUTORY REGULATION OF CONSTITUTIONALLY EMPOWERED
UNIVERSITIES: PRACTICES IN OTIOR JURISDICTIONS
In fourteen of the fifteen states, other than Missouri, in which the
governing boards of higher education generally or of one or more of the
public universities specifically receive grants of power from state consti-
tutional provisions, the courts have explicitly dealt with the issue of whether
the grant of power shields the governing board or the university from
103. Beginning with no academic degree programs in 1839, the University of
Missouri by 1975 offered a combined total of more than 1100 separate degree
programs through its four campuses: Columbia, Kansas City, Rolla and St. Louis.
Except for the half dozen or so degree programs that resulted from the 1915
legislative mandate contested in Heimberger, all of these programs were established
by the Board of Curators independently of formal approval by the legislature or
by any other state agency. The calculation of the number of degree programs is
based on the degree inventory reported in University of Missouri Academic Program
Inventory 1976-77, IR-774. Since 1839, the Board of Curators has established, also
without express legislative authority or directive, two new campuses (St. Louis and
Kansas City), and on the four campuses combined, some 29 separate academic
schools and colleges embracing more than 160 separate academic departments and
units. Other major initiatives taken by the Board of Curators, without legislative
mandate or express authorization, include the establishment of a medical malpractice
insurance program, a nuclear reactor facility, and a commercial television station.
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statutory regulation.'°4 In none of these jurisdictions have the courts accepted
the proposition that the constitutional grant of power to the governing
board is without effect in lawfully restraining the legislature from entering,
through statutory enactment, certain areas of university management and
control. It is equally evident from these jurisdictions' case law that courts
resist the notion that the constitutional grant of power to the governing
board, however broadly worded in its language, accords indiscriminant and
total autonomy to the university. Taking positions between these two
extremes, courts have formulated a variety of tests to decide whether
statutory enactments bind the university and its governing board.
In all fourteen jurisdictions, courts accept the corollary that, because
power is directly granted to the governing board of the university, statutory
enactments do not routinely apply to the university. 10 The question, there-
fore, becomes whether the particular statute at issue nonetheless applies to
the university because the statute qualifies as an exception to the general
rule. Explicit wording in a few jurisdictions' constitutional grants of power
that either assigns exclusive authority to the university's governing board
104. These states, and representative decisions in each of them, are Alabama:
Opinion of Justices, 417 So. 2d 946 (Ala. 1982); Stevens v. Thames, 204 Ala. 487,
86 So. 77 (1920); Alaska: Carter v. Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n, 663 P.2d 916
(Alaska 1983); University of Alaska v. National Aircraft Leasing, Ltd., 536 P.2d
121 (Alaska 1975); California: San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ.
of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 608 P.2d 277, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 533, 551 P.2d 844, 131 Cal. Rptr.
228 (1976); Colorado: Uberoi v. University of Colo., 713 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1986)
(en banc); Uberoi v. University of Colo., 686 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1984) (en banc);
Associated Students v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59
(1975) (en banc); Georgia: McCafferty v. Medical College, 249 Ga. 62, 287 S.E.2d
171 (1982); Hawaii: Levi v. University of Haw., 63 Haw. 366, 628 P.2d 1026
(1981); Idaho: Williams v. State Legislature, Ill Idaho 156, 722 P.2d 465 (1986);
Dreps v. Board of Regents, 65 Idaho 88, 139 P.2d 467 (1943); Michigan: Regents
of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Board of
Regents v. Auditor General, 167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911); Sterling v.
Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896); Minnesota:
Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1977); State ex rel.
Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952); Fanning v.
University of Minn., 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931); State ex rel. Univ. of
Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 220 N.W. 951 (1928); Montana: Board of Regents
v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975); Nebraska: Catania v. University
of Neb., 204 Neb. 304, 282 N.W.2d 27 (1979); University Police Officers Union
Local 567 v. University of Neb., 203 Neb. 4, 277 N.W.2d 529 (1979); Board of
Regents v. Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 256 N.W.2d 330 (1977); Nevada: Board of Regents
v. Oakley, 97 Nev. 605, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981); State ex rel. Richardson v. Board
of Regents, 70 Nev. 144, 261 P.2d 515 (1953); Oklahoma: Board of Regents v.
Baker, 638 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1981); South Dakota: Kanaly v. State, 368 N.W.2d
819 (S.D. 1985); South Dakota Board of Regents v. Meierhenry, 351 N.W.2d 450
(S.D. 1984); South Dakota Board of Regents v. Meister, 309 N.W.2d 121 (S.D.
1981).
105. See cases cited supra note 104.
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in enumerated areas or exempts certain areas from the jurisdiction of the
governing board assists courts in formulating these exceptions. 1o6 In such
instances, the court's role has been to determine not whether the statute
comes within a court-devised test permitting its application but whether
the statute, by its subject matter and effect, comes within the enumerated
areas. Explicit guidance from the language of the state constitution is rare,
however, and even if an area is named as belonging to the exclusive control
of the university's governing board, courts will have to judge whether the
statute, in fact, is within the meaning of the specified area.
Tests which courts most frequently apply in determining whether a
statute is lawfully binding upon the constitutionally empowered university
are formulated in broad and conclusory terms such as "statewide concern,"
"public policy," "state policy," and "general police power." 10 Under one
or more of these formulations, for example, the worker unemployment
compensation statutes applicable to the private sector may also be applied
to the University of California,10 the University of Idaho must observe
statutory regulations for the accounting and reporting of expenditures of
public funds, 109 courts have applied public sector labor law and the statutory
waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability to the University of
Michigan, 10 state statutes affecting public sector labor relations, highway
traffic control, the sale of intoxicants, and forest conservation have been
found to be permissible limitations of the power of the Board of Regents
106. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a) (subjecting the University of
California Board of Regents' "full powers of organization and government" to
"such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security of its funds
and compliance with the terms of the endowments of the university and ...
competitive bidding procedures. .. ."); CoLo. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (exempting
from legislative or statutory regulation the power of the Regents of the University
of Colorado to determine whether to establish and operate schools of medicine,
dentistry, nursing, and pharmacy, together with hospitals and supporting facilities
and health-related programs, at Denver); HAw. CONST. art. X, § 6 (providing the
University of Hawaii Board of Regents exclusive jurisdiction over the internal
organization and management of the university).
107. See, e.g., San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 26
Cal. 3d 785, 608 P.2d 277, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980) ("statewide concern" and
"police power"); Levi v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 366, 628 P.2d 1026 (1981)
("statewide concern"); Board of Regents v. Board of Trustees, 491 So. 2d 399
(La. App. 1986) ("public policy"); William C. Reichenbach Co. v. State, 94 Mich.
App. 323, 288 N.W.2d 622 (1979) ("public policy"); Board of Regents v. Judge,
168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975) ("public policy"); Board of Regents v. Oakley,
97 Nev. 605, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981) ("public policy").
108. San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal.
3d 785, 789, 608 P.2d 277, 279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 462 (1980).
109. Dreps v. Board of Regents, 65 Idaho 88, 96, 139 P.2d 467, 471 (1943).
110. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Employment Relations Comm'n, 389 Mich.
96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973) (public sector labor law); Branum v. Board of Regents,
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to govern the University of Minnesota,' state statutes concerning worker
unemployment compensation and public employee grievance procedures have
been held superior to any conflicting governing board rules and regulations
at the University of Nebraska," 2 and a statute prohibiting any state de-
partment, agency, or board from discharging an employee because of age
has been held to override the mandatory retirement age policy of the
University of Nevada.'
The use of such generalized and conclusory formulas in testing the
permissible limits of statutory regulation of constitutionally empowered
universities can easily create an illusion, rather than a reality, of effective
limits to statutory regulation. Except for statutes which are clearly special
legislation, all state statutes arguably deal with matters of statewide concern;
"public policy" and the "police power" tests are equally receptive to
conclusions favoring legislatures over special purpose bodies such as uni-
versity or higher education governing boards." 4 In most of these jurisdic-
tions, however, the case law indicates that the courts will bring to the
application of these broad and conclusory tests a variety of considerations
that can work to defeat arguments favoring applicability of the statutes.
At the core of these considerations is the court's attempt to identify the
functions which are "essential" or "integral" to the role of a university
governing board and without which the constitutional provision granting
the governing board the power to perform its role is meaningless.' As a
111. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1977).
112. University Police Officers Union Local 567 v. University of Neb., 203
Neb. 4, 11, 277 N.W.2d 529, 534 (1979).
113. Board of Regents v. Oakley, 97 Nev. 605, 637 P.2d 1199 (1981).
114. Similarly broad formulas have been used by courts in deciding whether
state statutes prevail over conflicting ordinandes and charters of municipalities
operating under a home rule constitutional provision. See Westbrook, supra note
76, at 61-66, 70-74. However, to analogize between the problems of constitutional
construction arising from conflicts between state statutes and ordinances of home
rule municipalities and the problems of constitutional construction arising from
conflicts between statutes and actions of governing boards of constitutionally em-
powered universities appears questionable. This is due to the differences typically
employed by the framers of the state constitutions in describing the powers of
each. Constitutional provisions empowering university governing boards, for ex-
ample, frequently do not contain a qualifying phrase making it explicit that the
boards are to govern in accordance with statutory laws.
115. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 417 So. 2d 946, 947 (Ala. 1982); San
Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 789, 791,
608 P.2d 277, 278, 280, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 461, 463 (1980); Levi v. University
of Haw., 63 Haw. 366, 371, 628 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1981); Board of Regents v.
Baker, 638 P.2d 464, 469 (Okla. 1981); Dreps v. Board of Regents, 65 Idaho 88,
96, 139 P.2d 467, 471 (1943); Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52,
65, 235 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1975); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d
796, 800-01 (Minn. 1977); Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 450, 543
P.2d 1323, 1335 (1975); Board of Regents v. Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 149, 256 N.W.2d
330, 333 (1977); Board of Regents v. Oakley, 97 Nev. 605, 608, 637 P.2d 1199,
1200 (1981); Board of Regents v. Baker, 638 P.2d 464, 469 (Okla. 1981).
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result of this functional screening, courts have held a number of statutes,
even if arguably involving matters of "statewide concern" or "public
policy," to be impermissible infringements of governing boards's power.
In Alabama, the governing boards of the constitutional universities, the
University of Alabama and Auburn University, cannot be bound by the
statutory requirement that public colleges and universities must have ap-
proval of the state higher education commission for either adding or
eliminating academic programs and departments." 6 In California, the con-
stitutional university, the University of California, cannot be bound by
statutory directives fixing either minimum salaries or salary ranges of its
employees, whether academic or non-academic." 7 In Hawaii, the consti-
tutional university, the University of Hawaii, is immune to statutory reg-
ulation of its course offering and student admissions policies." 8 In Idaho,
the state's nepotism law cannot be made lawfully binding on the consti-
tutional university, the University of Idaho."9
In Minnesota, the constitutional university, the University of Minnesota,
is immune to both executive and legislative actions that would deprive the
Board of Regents of its autonomy in the University's "internal control
and management," including specifically but not exclusively the determi-
nation of "educational policy.' 120 Even if, by accepting state appropriations,
the Board of Regents appears to have agreed to certain conditions expressly
stated in the appropriating legislation, the Board need not honor the
conditions if they are "intrusive into the internal control and management"
of the university.'2' In Nevada, the legislature may not, through a statute,
alter or modify the constitutionally granted power of the Board of Regents
of the University of Nevada by mandating the establishment of a group
of advisers who would, without the right to vote in Board proceedings,
nonetheless be entitled to participate in Board discussions.1n In Oklahoma,
the constitutionally empowered Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma is not bound by a statutory directive requiring it to provide to
all employees of the University a minimal increase in salaries and wages. 23
In Montana, the constitutionally empowered Board of Regents of Higher
Education, administering the state's university system, is not bound by
statutes limiting salary increases for presidents of campuses within the
system, prescribing salary schedules for non-academic employees within the
116. Opinion of the Justices, 417 So. 2d 946 (Ala. 1982).
117. San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d
785, 608 P.2d 277, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980).
118. Levi v. University of Haw., 63 Haw. 366, 371, 628 P.2d 1026, 1029
(1981).
119. Dreps v. Board of Regents, 65 Idaho 88, 139 P.2d 467 (1943).
120. Gleason v. University of Minn., 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650 (1908).
121. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d 796 (1977).
122. King v. Board of Regents, 65 Nev. 533, 200 P.2d 221 (1948).
123. Board of Regents v. Baker, 638 P.2d 464 (Okla. 1981).
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system, and requiring the deposit of the non-state funds of the university
system with the state treasurer.12 In Michigan, the governing boards of
the constitutional universities, the University of Michigan, Michigan State
University, and Wayne State University, are not bound by statutes requiring
payment and performance bonds of principal contractors for projects fi-
nanced by public funds. 2' While the legislature may advise these universities
as to quotas and fees concerning enrollments of out of state students, and
may require these universities to inform the state's Board of Education of
their plans to initiate new instructional and degree programs, Michigan
courts have indicated that if the legislature sought to go beyond the giving
of advice in the one area and the requiring of information in the other
area, it would be usurping the power constitutionally residing in the uni-
versities' governing boards. 26
VI. CONCLUSION
Of the two fundamental questions about the meaning of a constitutional
grant of power to the governing board of a public university in the United
States, Missouri courts have directly addressed one and substantially avoided
the other in cases involving the Board of Curators of the University of
Missouri. The question that has been addressed, and affirmatively answered,
is whether the constitutional grant of power permits the governing board
to act in the absence of enabling legislation. The Missouri Supreme Court
specifically confirmed the Board of Curators' authority, derived from art.
IX, § 9(a) of the Missouri Constitution vesting the "government" of the
University of Missouri in the Board of Curators, to issue revenue bonds.
Indicating a much broader reach of the Board's constitutionally derived
power is both a practice of frequent and significant Board use of such
power since 1839 and the court's endorsement in McReynolds and Neill
of past usage as an aid in interpreting the permissible scope of this power.
The second question, whether a constitutionally empowered university gov-
erning board is immune, in exercising its power, to certain, if not all,
statutory restrictions, remains unsettled in the case of the Board of Curators
of the University of Missouri.
Heimberger, decided in 1916, could be argued as having settled, ad-
versely to the Board of Curators, this second question. However, neither
the reasoning nor the subsequent history of Heimberger convincingly sup-
ports that argument. Heimberger's doctrinal reasoning asserting that, by
definition, "government" cannot include acts of creation, is so lacking in
historical and logical foundations as to make Heimberger highly vulnerable
124. Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975).
125. William C. Reichenbach Co. v. State, 94 Mich. App. 323, 288 N.W.2d
622 (1979).
126. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
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as controlling authority for the proposition that the constitutional grant
of power to the Board of Curators becomes a nullity in the face of each
and every statute, otherwise valid, that conflicts with a Board rule, reg-
ulation, or act. Even when the Missouri Supreme Court later cited Heim-
berger, it did not do so to sustain the applicability of a statute to the
University of Missouri, but for the purpose of affirming the validity of
art. IX, § 9(a) as a source of implied power for the Board of Curators. 127
More recent opinions of Missouri courts, in Public Service Employees
Local 45 and Tribune Publishing Co., involving respectively the application
of the Public Sector Labor Law and the Open Meetings Law to the
University of Missouri, assume without discussion the applicability of both
statutes to the University. To state on the basis of these two decisions
alone, however, that all statutes, otherwise valid, can be applied to restrict
the power granted by art. IX, § 9(a) stretches beyond recognition the limited
holdings of these decisions. It also runs counter to the weight of authority
in other jurisdictions with constitutionally empowered universities which
have deliberately examined the question.
Why is it that, in contrast with the result reached in other jurisdictions
with constitutionally empowered university or higher education governing
boards, there is still missing, in Missouri, judicial confirmation of the
constitutional grant of power as a shield as well as a sword, as a defense
against certain types of statutory restrictions of the Board of Curator's
power as well as a source of authority for the Board to act in the absence
of enabling legislation? Both the grant of power's language in the Missouri
Constitution and the 1875 Missouri Constitutional Convention Committee
on Education's expectations that its recommended constitutional provision
would not allow the legislature to disestablish the University in its entirety
or its departments separately seem to encourage, rather than deny, a
construction of the constitutional grant of power that includes protective
as well as authorizing purposes. History in a broader context also appears
to support such a construction: if the 19th century inspiration of consti-
tutional status for the public university in the United States had a single
purpose, it was that of assuring the public university some measure of
leverage in its relationship with the state legislature to offset the substantial
power that would be the legislature's through its control of the appro-
priations of funds to the university. 128 A grant of power that can be
exercised only as long as it is not affirmatively countered by another body
hardly meets the test of leverage that reasonable people have in mind.
A fully developed explanation for Missouri's failure to have secured
judicial recognition of a protective purpose, in addition to the authorization
purpose, of the constitutional grant of power to the Board of Curators
127. State ex rel. Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Neill, 397 S.W.2d 666,
669 (Mo. 1966) (en banc).
128. See L. GLENNY & T. DALGISH, supra note 7, at 13-19.
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of the University of Missouri is not likely to be found solely in an analysis
of case law. The refusal in 1916 of the Missouri Supreme Court to follow
the 1896 Michigan Supreme Court's lead in declaring a broadly protective
purpose in the constitutional grant of power to the state university, may,
for example, be explained as much by the differences in public and political
perceptions within each state of the purposes of their respective state
universities and in the national stature, comparatively, of the two universities
as by the reasoning marshalled by the Heimberger court to justify its
refusal.' 29 But there are elements of an explanatiofi in an examination of
the case law in Missouri and they are traceable to the Heimberger decision.
The reasoning in Heimberger stultified further judicial examination of the
issue; its interpreting "government" in the constitutional provision per-
taining to the Board of Curators so as to exclude acts of "origination"
not only ignored the logical and historical contradictions inherent in such
an interpretation but as well made unacceptably risky further litigation by
the Board on the issue. Without further litigation that either challenged
or forcefully argued a modification of the reasoning of Heimberger, Missouri
courts, in contrast with their counterparts in other jurisdictions, have
managed to ignore the issue.
Since 1916, the Board of Curators has avoided a strategy of aggressively
testing the limits of the Heimberger ruling and, with a few exceptions, the
General Assembly has also avoided enacting legislation that is so intrusive
into the internal operations and management as to compel the Board of
Curators to go to court to test the limits of such regulation."10 Although
129. The inordinate difficulty experienced by the University of Missouri in
consistently securing state-wide public and financial support is a recurring theme
in both of the leading histories of the University. See F. STEPHENs, supra note
19, and J. Vmzs, supra note 19. Not unrelated is the failure of the University of
Missouri to take a place among the nationally anked public universities, judging
especially by standards appropriate to post-baccalaureate programs. Summarizing
the first half-century of the University's development, Viles writes: .
It would be idle to assert that these fifty-six years of beginning and
preparations contribute any very distinctive chapter in the history of higher
education or of state universities. Certainly Missouri did not dominate the
intellectual and social history of its state as Harvard did Boston and much
of New England, nor even remotely approach such a place in the social
history of Missouri. Nor was Missouri the trial laboratory for ideas such
as made Michigan unique among western state universities.
J. Vnzs, supra note 19, at 242.
130. In terms of subject matter and potential effect on the future development
of the University of Missouri, especially at its more recently established Kansas
City and St. Louis campuses, the most significant statutory restriction imposed in
recent years by the General Assembly on the Board of Curators results from a
provision in the 1974 Reorganization Act, requiring approval by the state Coor-
dinating Board for Higher Education for "proposed new degree programs to be
offered by the state institutions of higher education." Mo. REv. STAT. § 173.005(2)(1)
(1986). The Board of Curators has chosen not to contest the constitutionality of
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legally untidy, the result in Missouri is not without its merits. Ambiguity
has its purposes, in law as in other areas of human affairs. Both the
Board of Curators and the General Assembly have undoubtedly observed
that there is value in not depending principally upon the courts to resolve
whatever jurisdictional disagreements they may have in their relationships.
Flexibility, conflict avoidance, and compromise frequently advance good
purposes, in higher education as in other sectors of society. There is,
however, a future price possibly to be paid by the Board of Curators for
this ambiguity. In the absence of aggressive efforts to secure judicial
acceptance of the claim that the Board's constitutionally granted power
limits the statutory regulation of the University of Missouri, the Board
might discover in court, at some later date, that its failure to have previously
litigated the issue is convincing evidence, in the form of usage, that the
claim is without merit.
the applicability of this provision to the Board of Curators, and has followed the
practice of first submitting to the Coordinating Board, for its approval, new degree
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